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NO. 5 FEBRUARY 2019 Introduction 
Extraterritorial U.S. Sanctions 
Only Domestic Courts Could Effectively Curb the Enforcement of U.S. Law Abroad 
Sascha Lohmann 
The long reach of U.S. law affects persons, property, and acts around the world. In 
trying to shield EU-based individuals and entities with commercial interests from its 
adverse impact, European policy-makers have recently been exposed as more or less 
helpless. In order to pursue their strategic objectives more effectively, Europeans 
must not only focus on increasing strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S. government. 
Absent a diplomatic agreement with the executive branch, they must also better uti-
lize available channels of influence. One potential avenue would be to substantially 
support EU-based companies in domestic courts – both diplomatically as well as finan-
cially – in order to challenge the executive branch when enforcing U.S. law beyond 
borders. Only the judicial branch can effectively curb the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. jurisdiction. 
 
Since the founding of the republic, the 
U.S. government has continuously asserted 
authority beyond its borders in the pursuit 
of economic, foreign, and national security 
policy objectives. Three main factors account 
for the extension of U.S. law to persons, 
property, and acts located or conducted 
abroad: Firstly, an ideological commitment 
to natural law expressed in a firm commit-
ment to the sanctity of inalienable rights 
believed to transcend national borders. 
Secondly, a legal culture shaped by the 
experience of steady territorial expansion 
and domination – initially as a former 
frontier society, and later as a self-restrained 
occupying force after World War II. And, 
thirdly, an independent judiciary that 
enjoys wide latitude to determine the geo-
graphical scope of statutory law and its 
implementation through administrative 
regulations. 
The extraterritorial reach of U.S. law 
derives from statutes enacted by Congress 
(prescriptive jurisdiction); regulations and 
rules administered by the administration 
(enforcement jurisdiction); as well as liti-
gation in domestic courts (adjudicative 
jurisdiction). During the late 18th and early 
19th centuries, the long reach of U.S. law 
mostly concerned torts and piracy. Starting 
in the early 20th century, U.S. law grad-
ually began to be applied extraterritorially 
in the realms of environmental and eco-
nomic regulation, with the latter including 
anti-trust, banking, bankruptcy, securities, 
taxation, and labor. Since the 1970s, the 
extraterritorial reach of domestic law has 
increased significantly as U.S. policy-makers 
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have pursued a wide range of foreign policy 
and national security objectives. Encroach-
ing upon the sovereignty of other nations, 
the assertion of U.S. authority beyond bor-
ders has repeatedly sparked intense politi-
cal conflicts with adversaries and allies 
alike. An acute contemporary conflict of 
U.S. and EU law is currently unfolding in 
the case of Iran. 
How U.S. Trumps European Law 
On May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump 
fulfilled yet another campaign promise by 
announcing to cease U.S. participation in 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA). Under the terms of the executive 
agreement, which was not ratified by the 
U.S. Senate but endorsed in Security Coun-
cil Resolution 2231, the Iranian govern-
ment agreed to strict limits on – and 
enhanced monitoring of – its nuclear 
program in exchange for relief from inter-
national sanctions. Criticizing the limited 
duration and insubstantial scope of the 
JCPOA, the Trump administration’s with-
drawal was immediately followed by a 
“maximum pressure” strategy. Its objective, 
as laid out by Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo in May 2018, is to force the Iranian 
leadership into accepting a set of 12 far-
reaching demands that are geared to funda-
mentally change not only its nuclear but 
also regional and domestic policies. 
The principle means to pursue these 
maximalist demands is the use of unilateral 
U.S. sanctions. On August 6, 2018, President 
Trump issued Executive Order 13846, which 
re-instated the so-called nuclear-related, 
unilateral U.S. sanctions previously lifted 
under the terms of the JCPOA. The impact 
of those measures had crippled the Iranian 
economy between mid-2010 and late 2013. 
A first wave entered into effect immediately, 
encompassing a limited set of prohibitions 
on purchases of U.S. dollar banknotes by 
the Iranian government; the sale, supply, 
or transfer of various metals to or from 
Iran; the purchase or holding of Iranian 
rials or Iranian sovereign debt; as well as 
transactions involving the Iranian auto-
motive sector. A second wave entered into 
effect on November 5, 2018, containing 
numerous measures collectively aimed 
at curtailing the Iranian government’s 
revenue from oil exports. 
Additionally, the Trump administration 
had continued to strictly enforce the so-
called non-nuclear sanctions until early 
November 2018. The departments of the 
Treasury and State blacklisted 168 individ-
uals and entities in 19 rounds for their 
involvement in the Iranian ballistic missile 
program and alleged human rights viola-
tions against the Iranian people. 
Well ahead of the deadlines set by the 
Trump administration and absent any 
enforcement action, major European and 
Asian companies withdrew from the other-
wise lucrative Iranian market. Most nota-
bly, this included the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT) – the most widely used messaging 
system among international financial insti-
tutions – which cut off most of the more 
than 50 Iranian banks in early November 
2018, including the Central Bank of Iran, 
after they again became subject to U.S. 
financial sanctions. 
The withdrawal of EU-based companies 
from Iran-related business further decreased 
the incentives for the Iranian leadership to 
uphold its commitments under the JCPOA, 
as it contributed to the worsening of eco-
nomic conditions. Apart from further push-
ing the JCPOA to the brink of collapse, the 
exodus of EU-based companies has revealed 
an inconvenient truth to European policy-
makers, namely that those companies are 
effectively regulated in Washington, D.C. 
Europeans Exposed As Helpless 
In response to President Trump’s decision 
to cease U.S. participation in the JCPOA, 
European foreign policy-makers publicly 
vowed to keep the Iranian nuclear deal 
from falling apart. In order to protect EU-
based companies from the looming threat 
of re-imposed unilateral U.S. sanctions, the 
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governments of France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom (E3), together with the 
European Union (EU), acted on four differ-
ent fronts. Firstly, the European Council 
updated Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 
to include many – but not all – unilateral 
U.S. sanctions against Iran. This so-called 
blocking statute prohibits EU-based individ-
uals and companies from complying with 
six statutes and one set of regulations listed 
in the annex, while providing a clawback 
provision to recover incurred damages in 
European courts. Secondly, the European 
Council and the European Parliament up-
dated the External Lending Mandate of the 
European Investment Bank to facilitate 
loans for private investment in Iran. Thirdly, 
the European Commission unveiled a set of 
confidence-building measures, including a 
€50 million support package for economic 
cooperation with – and assistance for – 
the Iranian private sector. Fourthly, the 
High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
working jointly with the French and Ger-
man governments, set up a payment 
mechanism independent from the U.S. 
dollar. The Instrument in Support of Trade 
Exchanges (INSTEX) – registered in France 
and overseen by three high-ranking bureau-
crats from the E3 – is designed to enable 
the bartering of Iranian commodities, and 
potentially those from other suppliers, in 
exchange for European goods, technology, 
and services without an underlying finan-
cial transaction. The Russian and Chinese 
governments have previously engaged in 
similar steps. For example, the China Inter-
national Payment System has allowed cross-
border and offshore financial transactions 
denominated in renminbi since October 
2015. 
However, these steps have fallen short of 
achieving their intended purpose of protect-
ing EU-based companies from the re-imposed 
unilateral U.S. sanctions. To start with, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 had 
previously been ineffective because its com-
paratively small fines did not outweigh the 
much greater damage resulting from dis-
obeying unilateral U.S. sanctions. Moreover, 
the so-called blocking statute was undercut 
by mixed signals that were mainly sent 
from the German chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, who had raised doubts about its 
effective implementation on the national 
level. In fact, the language of the statute is 
ambiguous while also enabling EU-based 
companies to make their own business 
decisions to abstain from certain transac-
tions. Those may incidentally happen to 
be targeted by certain unilateral U.S. sanc-
tions. In any case, favorable judgments 
secured in European courts would be largely 
unenforceable in the United States. 
Whereas the technical implementation 
is relatively straightforward, the INSTEX 
seems hardly connectable to private busi-
nesses, the majority of which would remain 
highly reluctant to engage in potentially 
illegal – or, at least, sanctionable – activ-
ity under U.S. law. This substantial risk 
extends to small and medium-sized com-
panies willing to continue trade with Iran 
and without – or very little – exposure to 
the U.S. market, given that their respective 
business partners might stop dealing with 
them. Due to these difficulties of connect-
ing such a special purpose vehicle to the 
broader European economy, it may only 
be suited to facilitate trade in agricultural 
commodities, medicine, and medical goods 
that is still legal under U.S. law. 
Therefore, the currently available policy 
options at the disposal of European for-
eign policy-makers fall short of effectively 
changing the risk calculus of EU-based 
companies threatened by the extraterri-
torial reach of U.S. law. As a consequence, 
the EU/E3 seem unable to safeguard the 
JCPOA – one of their major foreign policy 
achievements – from being actively sabo-
taged by the Trump administration. Where-
as previous administrations have backed 
down out of a concern for not wanting to 
alienate their European allies, the Trump 
administration shows no intention of 
resolving the trans-Atlantic conflict of laws 
in a similar fashion. This uncompromising 
stance could intensify, as the administra-
tion may soon be mandated by Congress 
to significantly increase its enforcement 
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of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Russia 
or China, with potentially devastating 
effects for European – and particularly 
German – economic and security interests. 
As a matter of fact, any potential decrease 
in European exposure to U.S. goods, tech-
nology, and (financial) services will offer 
little protection against extraterritorial U.S. 
sanctions, which increasingly target per-
sons, property, and acts without any nexus 
to U.S. jurisdiction whatsoever. 
Statutory Sources 
The most important statutory sources pre-
scribing unilateral U.S. sanctions in the 
realm of foreign policy and national secu-
rity are the Trading with the Enemy Act of 
1917 (TWEA) during wartime, and the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 
(IEEPA) during peacetime. Upon a prior dec-
laration of the existence of a national emer-
gency under the National Emergencies Act of 
1976, the president can invoke the broad 
powers delegated by Congress under the 
IEEPA in order to prohibit almost any un-
licensed import into, as well as any unli-
censed export of goods, technology, and 
(financial) services from the United States, 
including re-exports from third countries. 
Most notably, the IEEPA allows the presi-
dent to block property, as well as any in-
terest therein, under the jurisdiction of the 
United States. 
Besides the TWEA and the IEEPA, further 
statutes prescribe unilateral U.S. sanctions. 
Most importantly, those include the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), the Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976 (AECA), and the Export 
Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), which provide 
the president with the authority to prohibit 
almost any unlicensed export of nuclear 
equipment and materials (AEA), military 
items and software (AECA), as well as dual-
use goods, technology, and services (ECA), 
including re-exports from third countries. 
All of the aforementioned statutes con-
tain so-called primary sanctions, as they 
only target persons, property, and acts that 
are “subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.” Although the concrete reach of any 
of those laws may vary – depending on the 
specific legal language employed – some 
similarities do exist. The term “U.S. person” 
usually encompasses individuals physically 
present within the United States, as well as 
U.S. citizens and nationals anywhere in the 
world. The term “entity” typically includes 
both non-profit organizations as well as 
companies organized under U.S. laws, in-
cluding their foreign branches. And the 
term “property” commonly applies to any 
goods, technology, and (financial) services 
that are exported from the United States 
or re-exported from third countries. 
Since the early 1990s, bipartisan majori-
ties in Congress have begun to enact stat-
utes prescribing so-called secondary sanc-
tions. Despite continuous opposition from 
the executive branch, a steadily growing 
number of laws target non-U.S. persons 
engaged in specific conduct such as invest-
ing in specific sectors of the Iranian and 
Russian economies or transacting with per-
sons blacklisted by the U.S. administration. 
Technically, there can be no violation of 
secondary sanctions because the triggering 
activities are not prohibited under U.S. law 
but sanctionable. In any case, the president 
enjoys considerable flexibility in imple-
menting secondary sanctions, as doing so 
requires a prior determination of non-com-
pliance by non-U.S. persons. Consequently, 
U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging 
in certain transactions, which may result in 
a partial or comprehensive cut-off from the 
$14 trillion U.S. economy. For example, 
the secretary of the Treasury can order U.S. 
banks to close or impose strict conditions 
on the opening or maintaining of corre-
spondent or payable-through accounts on 
behalf of a foreign bank, thereby closing 
down access to dollarized transactions – 
the “Wall Street equivalent of the death 
penalty.” Furthermore, Congress authorized 
the Department of the Treasury in 2012 to 
block property under U.S. jurisdiction of 
those non-U.S. persons transacting with cer-
tain blacklisted Iranian persons. 
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Extraterritorial Enforcement 
Unilateral U.S. sanctions are enforced extra-
territorially by various executive agencies. 
Those include, but are not limited to, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission within the 
Department of Energy, which administers 
regulations promulgated under the AEA; 
the Bureau of Industry and Security within 
the Department of Commerce, which ad-
ministers regulations promulgated under 
the ECA; and the Directorate of Defense 
Trade Controls within the Department of 
State, which administers regulations pro-
mulgated under the AECA. 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) within the Department of the Treas-
ury promulgates regulations under the 
IEEPA as well as a small number of other 
statutes. The OFAC also maintains the 
notorious Specially Designated Nationals 
(SDN) and Blocked Persons List, currently 
composed of more than 13,000 individuals 
and entities. A listing results in the block-
ing of property, and any interest therein, 
that is owned or controlled by any one of 
the entries and falls under U.S. jurisdiction. 
Moreover, U.S. persons are generally pro-
hibited from transacting with so-called 
SDNs. 
All SDNs were designated under at least 
one of the more than 30 country-based or 
issue-specific programs targeting both state 
and non-state actors. Most of these pro-
grams have been initiated by executive 
orders pursuant to the IEEPA, although 
some were directly enacted through statutes 
passed by Congress. The respective reasons 
for being added to the SDN List can either 
be status- or conduct-based. The latter in-
cludes a variety of alleged actions incrimi-
nated under various statutes, such as ma-
terial support for international terrorism; 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tions and their means of delivery; human 
rights abuses; as well as transnational 
crimes such as narcotics trafficking and 
malicious cyber-enabled activity. 
The regulations promulgated by the 
OFAC under the IEEPA commonly lack any 
applicable threshold for establishing liabil-
ity. Consequently, any export of goods, 
services, or technology from the United 
States that has not previously been author-
ized either through a specific or general 
license is strictly prohibited, regardless of 
the quantity. But compared to its wartime 
predecessors, the OFAC has generally shown 
forbearance in defining the reach of its en-
forcement jurisdiction. Hence, most regula-
tions solely apply to U.S. persons, except 
for the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and 
the Iran Transaction and Sanctions Regulations, 
which apply to “any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.” This 
seemingly small difference carries profound 
legal implications because it effectively ex-
tends U.S. jurisdiction over the large num-
ber of independently operating foreign sub-
sidiaries of U.S. parent companies. 
In order to enforce the IEEPA, the OFAC 
can impose civil monetary fines of up to 
$295,141 per violation, or twice the amount 
of the incriminated transaction. The exact 
amount is calculated by weighing various 
factors laid out in the Economic Sanctions 
Enforcement Guidelines. This administra-
tive process offers little transparency and 
is not subject to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. In De-
cember 2007, Congress established liability 
for anyone who causes a U.S. person to 
violate the IEEPA. This led the OFAC to slap 
huge civil fines on major foreign banks 
facilitating financial transactions cleared 
in dollars on behalf of persons blacklisted 
by the U.S. administration. 
Furthermore, the OFAC can directly 
monitor compliance with its regulations 
by delisted non-U.S. persons. Such a case 
recently involved an agreement between 
the OFAC and three companies previously 
controlled and majority-owned by an SDN, 
the Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska. 
In the future, the OFAC may become more 
and more adept in targeting prominent 
individuals who may be important share-
holders of major companies without dis-
rupting global value chains. 
Finally, the OFAC can refer violations of 
the IEEPA to the Department of Justice for 
criminal prosecution. This guarantees more 
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due process protections under the U.S. 
Constitution. However, a conviction might 
result in huge monetary penalties as well as 
imprisonment of up to 30 years. The extra-
territorial enforcement is supported by 
extradition treaties to detain individuals 
sought by the U.S. Department of Justice 
in third countries. Recent prominent cases 
involve the arrest of the Chief Financial 
Officer of the Chinese telecommunication 
company Huawei, Meng Wanzhou, who 
was detained by Canadian authorities in 
early December based on a warrant issued 
by the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District 
of New York. Another high-profile case 
revolved around Reza Zarrab, who was 
arrested during a family trip to Miami, FL, 
in March 2016. He was charged with six 
counts – among them conspiracy to evade 
unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran – 
that would have carried a sentence of up 
to 70 years in prison. By pleading guilty 
and agreeing to act as a cooperating witness 
against another defendant in the same 
case, Zarrab eventually reduced his pending 
sentence. 
No Limits under International Law 
The extraterritorial prescription of U.S. 
law and its extraterritorial enforcement by 
means of unilateral sanctions occupies a 
gray area in public international law, which 
governs interactions between sovereign 
nation-states either through formal treaties 
or widely accepted customs. 
With regard to conventional international 
law, the U.S. government enjoys wide lati-
tude to curtail trade and financial trans-
actions. In its numerous bilateral treaties 
of friendship, commerce, and navigation 
concluded with other nations, the U.S. gov-
ernment faces no limits on its use of uni-
lateral sanctions due to foreign policy and 
national security exceptions. This lack of 
legal barriers to the extraterritorial reach 
of U.S. law also holds true for multilateral 
treaties, which commonly contain broad 
exceptions for matters of national security. 
Those include Article VIII Section 2(b) of the 
Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund and Article XXI of the World 
Trade Organization. Contrary to the vocal 
critics of unilateral U.S. sanctions, there 
exists no right to economic exchange, ac-
cording to the landmark ruling Nicaragua 
v. United States by the International Court 
of Justice dating from June 1986. Up until 
today, the application of economic power 
in international relations has so far largely 
defied attempts at legalization. 
With respect to customary international 
law, the U.S. government is generally per-
mitted to assert prescriptive and enforce-
ment jurisdiction extraterritorially on the 
basis of the following five principles. Firstly, 
the objective territoriality principle allows the 
U.S. government to address direct and sub-
stantial effects resulting from acts commit-
ted beyond U.S. borders. Also known as the 
“effects doctrine,” this principle originated 
from the century-old subjective territoriality 
principle, which establishes jurisdiction over 
persons, property, and acts located or con-
ducted within U.S. territory. Secondly, the 
active nationality principle permits the U.S. 
government to regulate its own citizens and 
nationals anywhere in the world. Thirdly, 
the passive nationality principle enables the 
U.S. government to prosecute harm or inju-
ries done to its citizens or nationals abroad. 
Fourthly, the protective principle may estab-
lish jurisdiction to counter threats to U.S. 
national security. Finally, the universality 
principle can be advanced to bring to justice 
the perpetrators of crimes committed 
against humanity. 
The application of these principles to 
concrete situations is open to interpreta-
tion. Beyond the protective principle, 
the U.S. administration has extensively 
stretched two particular principles in order 
to justify the long reach of its jurisdiction 
to enforce U.S. law abroad in recent years. 
Firstly, the OFAC commonly has relied on 
the active nationality principle in order to 
claim enforcement jurisdiction over foreign 
companies that are owned or controlled by 
a U.S. person more than 50 percent (or, in 
some instances, even less). This so-called 
control theory has remained controversial 
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ever since it was initially adopted by the 
Theodor S. Roosevelt administration in late 
1942 in the fight against the Axis powers. 
Later on, this expansive interpretation of 
U.S. jurisdiction had been repudiated in 
the landmark decision Barcelona Traction, 
handed down in February 1970 by the 
International Court of Justice, which ruled 
that the place of incorporation would deter-
mine the nationality of a company, and not 
the nationality of its owners or sharehold-
ers. This line of reasoning was strongly 
reaffirmed by the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities in an aide-mémoire sent 
to the U.S. Department of State in August 
1982. The démarche was part of the Euro-
pean response to a prior extension of U.S. 
export controls to extend to subsidiaries 
of U.S. parent companies incorporated in 
Europe, and that had been involved in 
the construction of a gas pipeline between 
West Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, the U.S. government 
regularly stretches the nationality principle 
by attaching its enforcement jurisdiction 
not only to goods, technology, and (finan-
cial) services after they are exported, but 
also to any goods, technology, and (finan-
cial) services located beyond U.S. borders 
that contain more than 10 percent of U.S.-
origin components. Most importantly, the 
clearing of dollars between two foreign 
banks – a ubiquitous practice at the heart 
of the global economy – is construed by 
the U.S. administration and some federal 
courts as constituting an export of services 
from the United States. This is because it 
involves a correspondent account held at 
a U.S. bank. 
Secondly, the OFAC and other agencies 
have stretched the objective territoriality 
principle, shifting the focus away from the 
location in which a regulated act occurs to 
where its effects materialize. Initially recog-
nized by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in its landmark Lotus case 
dating from September 1927, it found its 
way into U.S. jurisprudence through the 
decision United States v. Alcoa by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit (148 F.2d 
416) in March 1945. In contrast to estab-
lished practice in the realm of U.S. anti-
trust statutes, the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of the IEEPA generally lacks any 
objective criteria as to when certain effects 
materializing within the United States may 
be deemed as “direct” and “substantial.” 
Therefore, interpretations of the objective 
territoriality principle with respect to U.S. 
foreign policy and national security policy 
remain highly subjective. 
By simultaneously stretching the nation-
ality and objective territoriality principle 
and undermining the subjective territoriality 
principle, the U.S. government further con-
tributes to sidelining the century-old prin-
ciple of comity, which counsels restraint in 
the case of concurrent jurisdiction by more 
than one state. Without comity, however, 
President Trump’s favored reassertion of 
the nation-state within the international 
order is bound to perpetuate legal conflicts. 
Curbs through Domestic Courts 
Contrary to Article 25 of the German Grund-
gesetz, which incorporates international 
law into domestic law, the U.S. Constitution 
spells out no limits for Congress to extend 
its laws extraterritorially. But most U.S. 
statutes and their implementing regula-
tions remain silent on their geographical 
scope, including the IEEPA. The precise 
reach of U.S. statutes beyond borders must 
consequently be discerned by the judiciary. 
Indeed, many federal district courts have 
supported the U.S. administration’s expan-
sive interpretation of its enforcement juris-
diction while not even considering possible 
limits to the extraterritorial reach of the 
IEEPA. Thus, the district courts did not 
engage in weighing the respective interests 
of the United States and those of the other 
nations involved in each respective case. 
Most foreign defendants charged with vio-
lating U.S. law abroad have generally pre-
ferred to forego criminal proceedings in 
exchange for entering into Deferred Pros-
ecution Agreements, in which they submit 
to civil enforcement by the U.S. adminis-
tration. Up until now, the extraterritorial 
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application of the IEEPA has rarely been 
litigated in federal district and appellate 
courts, let alone in the Supreme Court. 
Despite this reluctance, which is under-
standable given the high reputational and 
business risks involved, the prospects for 
successfully challenging the U.S. adminis-
tration’s expansive interpretation of its 
enforcement jurisdiction in domestic courts 
may have grown recently. This is due to a 
strengthening of a set of rules developed by 
the Supreme Court to interpret the reach 
of extraterritorial U.S. jurisdiction, which is 
binding for the lower courts. Known as the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality,” it 
holds that U.S. law would primarily apply 
domestically unless Congress has explicitly 
determined otherwise. This set of rules 
complements an earlier set of rules known 
as the “Charming Betsy” presumption, which 
dates back to the early 19th century. 
Accordingly, the intent of Congress could 
only be interpreted to violate international 
law if no other construction is possible. 
Taken together, these two so-called 
canons of statutory construction could pro-
vide leverage for defendants charged with 
having violated U.S. law abroad, arguing 
that U.S. jurisdiction may not be applied to 
them or their conduct. Additional leverage 
may soon be provided, given the unob-
structed nominations of conservative judges 
to the federal bench by a solid Republican 
majority in the U.S. Senate. Most of the 
candidates nominated by President Trump 
share a particular judicial philosophy that 
espouses a textual reading of the U.S. Con-
stitution and is deeply skeptical about the 
growth of executive power and the expan-
sion of the administrative state during the 
last 60 years. A sign in this direction: The 
Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear 
a case that might revoke – or at least cir-
cumscribe – the so-called Auer deference. 
This precedent was initially set in the deci-
sion Auer v. Robbins dating from 1997, which 
has allowed executive agencies to interpret 
ambiguous regulations on their own ever 
since. A conservative majority on the Su-
preme Court may even go a step further 
and reconsider the precedent set in Chevron 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 
The 1984 decision has allowed executive 
agencies to interpret the meaning of 
statutes that authorize their actions. 
As a complement to the rather helpless 
efforts at increasing their strategic autonomy 
vis-à-vis the U.S. government, European 
foreign policy-makers could better utilize 
existing channels of influence by relying 
upon the U.S. judiciary within the constitu-
tional system of check and balances. In 
practice, this means systematically encour-
aging and eventually assisting EU-based 
companies in domestic courts to challenge 
the U.S. administration’s extraterritorial 
enforcement of the IEEPA, and potentially 
also other statutes. Such a course of action 
would require close cooperation between 
the European Commission, individual 
member states, and the private sector on 
both sides of the Atlantic. But absent a 
diplomatic agreement with the U.S. admin-
istration or significant pushback from 
Congress, it may provide the only remedy 
to effectively protect European sovereignty 
through the normative power of the rule 
of law. 
Dr Sascha Lohmann is an Associate in the Americas Division. 
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